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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCT I ON 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND : ﬂ 
Anyone who surveys the ‘ni cry and structure of labour law 
must become aware of the inherent tension between the social' 
demands of the employment relationship and the spirit and 
possibilities of the law. The evolution of an orderly and, compared 
with many other countries, even today, reasonably well—functioning 
system of labour relations, was one of the great achievements of 
our civilisation. 
The system of collective bargaining rests on a balance of the 
collective forces of management and organised labour. To maintain 
it has on the whole been the poiicy of the legislature during the 
last twenty years or so. The welfare of the nation has depended 
on its continuity and growing; strength. This ,1 n .' whimwnt. : uu-M. 
it is to be hoped, by all political par-ties represented in Parliament. 
If it is important to an understanding of Labour Law to acropl’ 
the limitations of the Common Law, it is equally important to 
realise the limitations of the law as a whole in this area, as 
elsewhere. The law governing labour relations is one of the central 1)] 
important branches of the law — the legal basis on which the very 
large majority of people earn their living. No one should be 
qualified as a lawyer — professionally or academically — who has 
not mastered its principles. 
But the law can make only a modest contribution to ths: 
standard of living of the population. 
Law is a secondary force in human affairs, and especially in 
labour relations. Law is a technique for the regulation of socirﬂ 
pcwer. 
Power — the capacity effectively to direct the behaviour of 
others — is unevenly diatrihutod in an norivl,i<~z:. ‘I‘hvrv mu he [m 
society without a subordination of smut: m‘ its mmnlmru Ln ul.lu~n:,
without command and obedience, without rule makers and decision 
makers. The power to make policy, to make rules and to make 
decisions and to ensure that these are obeyed, is a social power. 
It rests on many foundations, on wealth, on personal prestige, 
on tradition, sometimes on physical force, often on sheer inertia. 
It is sometimes supported and sometimes restrained, and sometimes 
even created by law, but the law is not the principal source of 
social power. 
Labour Law is chiefly concerned with this elementary phenomena 
of social power. And - this is important - it is concerned with 
social power irrespective of the share which the law itself has had 
in establishing it. 
This is a point the importance of which cannot be sufficiently 
stronsnd. As a social phenomenon the power to command and the 
:iulmr-utiuu L0 LhuL power are the Hume no ImLLer whether the power 
is exercised by a person clothed with a "public" function, or by 
a private person, an employer or a trade union official. 
The subordination to power and the nature of obedience do not 
differ as between pure1y_socia1 or private and legal or public 
relations. It is a profound error to establish a contrast between 
society and the state and to see one in terms of co—ordinati on, 
the other in terms of subordination. As regards labour relations 
that error is fatal. 
The law does and to some extent must conceal the realities of 
subordination behind the conceptual screen of contracts considered 
as concluded between equals. 
The relation between an employer and an isolated employee or 
worker is typically a relation between a bearer of power and one 
who is not a bearer of power. 
In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation 
it is a condition of subordination may be concealed by that 
indispensable fig‘ent of the legal mind known as the "contract of 
employment . " 1
The main object of Labour Law, has always been, and we venture 
to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract 
the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be 
inherent in the employment relationship. Most of labour legislation 
must be seen as a protective legislation. It is an attempt to infuse 
law into a relation of command and subordination. 
Everywhere the effectiveness of the law depends on the unions 
far more than the unions depend on the effectiveness of the law. 
The effectiveness of the unions, however, depends to some extent on 
forces which neither they nor the law can control. If one looks at 
unemployment statistics and at the statistics of union membership? 
one on see a correlation. Very often, as employment falls, so 
does union membership.5 
The characteristic feature of the employment relation is thus 
that the individual worker is subordinated to the power of 
rmnagement but that power of management is co—ordinated with that 
of organised labour. The worker has the legal right and moral duty 
to be a member of the relevant union. He may have the legal 
freedom not to be a member of a union, just as the citizen is free 
to vote. But he has no more a moral right to abstain from being a 
union member than a citizen has to abstain from voting. The equation 
of the freedom not to associate with the freedom to associate is a 
fallacy. Nothing is more misleading that the ambiguity of the word 
'freedom' in labour relations. The danger begins if ‘freedom' is 
taken for a social fact rather than a verbal symbol ﬂat is, which 
may in many spheres of life, not only in labour relations be not 
more than the freedom to restrict or to give up one‘s freedom. 
Conversely, to restrain a person's freedom may be necessary to 
protect his freedom, that is, to protect him against oppression 
which he may otherwise be constrained to impose upon himself 
through an act of his legally free and socially unfree will. 
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